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Abstract
Shoulder surﬁng attack is a great threat on password based authentication technique. As today’s world has seen a rapid growth of
mobile users thus, latest methodologies which are developed to address this attack preferably should support mobile users. In this
paper we have proposed a new shoulder surﬁng resilient technique, MobSecure, which is designed to be used in smartphone and
acts in a partially observable environment (where an auxiliary device is required for authentication). Additionally the proposed
method is also capable of avoiding recording based attack for inﬁnite number of authentication sessions. Allowing alphanumeric
characters as password is one of the key properties of the proposed scheme here. Finally, we show that MobSecure attains highest
security standard with moderate usability scores compared to existing partially observable approaches.
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ICACC 2016.
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1. Introduction
Among four factors of authentication techniques1, password based authentication clearly dominates the others due
to its usability standard. Though high usability values are maintained but password based authentication reveals many
of its drawbacks over times2 3 4 5. Shoulder surﬁng attack is considered as one such threat which is more common in
public places like ATM counter, PoS terminal etc. Under this attack scenario adversary observes the login information
which are being entered by the genuine user and later those credentials can be used to impersonate the actual user.
In the past decade the world has seen a huge growth in number of mobile users. Increasing number of mobile users
leads to various kind of data theft in public domain. According to the report, smart phone theft aﬀects 1.6 million
devices in U.S. alone6 − with majority of ﬁnders attempting to access private user data7. This statistics show that,
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indeed there is an urgency of designing a shoulder surﬁng resilient protocol which may act in mobile environment to
address the considered threat.
Existing methodologies that have been proposed to overcome this attack are mainly rely upon challenge−response
protocol. User’s response (R) is based on the original password (P) and the generated challenge (C) by the system.
Thus, R can be thought as a function of P and C. With each session as C varies so R also vary. Thus, the protocol can
help in authenticating a genuine user without revealing the actual password for each session.
1.1. Motivation and Contribution
Due to alarming growth of data theft in mobile devices, there is an urge in developing a shoulder surﬁng resilient
approach implemented on mobile device. The existing setups implemented on such devices are suﬀering from limited
password space8 9 as there is a constraint in screen size in mobile devices to accommodate too many characters, which
build the password space for users.
In fact, there are very little work done in this direction to defend this attack in mobile environment. There are some
potential approaches which can be implemented on mobile devices. In 1999, G.T. Wilfong proposed a nice strategy
for bypassing the attack10. As this method method doesn’t have any on-screen visual interface thus, the method
is very much implementable on mobile devices. But this method has two major drawbacks as − it only supports
the set of digits {0, 1, ..., 9} as secret and user requires some mathematical knowledge for login. In 2010, proposed
method by Perkovic et al. overcame the limitation of previous approach as user requires no mathematical operation for
login11. The user login process is guided by a visual interface (a 10 × 10 table) which can be nicely ﬁtted on mobile
screen too. Though this method enhances the acceptability by the common users but limited password space (of
cardinality 10) still remains a matter of security concern related to this scheme. Some of the lately proposed methods
(e.g., Color Pass12) not only suﬀer from limited password space but also requires large screen size to accommodate the
challenge interface. Recently Kwon and Na proposed a method namelyDrag and Type13 which supports alphanumeric
password to be chosen by user and acts in mobile environment too but the main drawback of this method is that
it provides security against weak shoulder surﬁng attack only. Thus, there is an urgency in designing a shoulder
surﬁng resilient approach which will support alphanumeric password and provide security against strong adversary14
to address shoulder surﬁng attack in mobile environment.
Mainly motivated by aforementioned facts we have made following major contributions in this paper.
• We propose MobSecure which supports alphanumeric password to be chosen by user. MobSecure is imple-
mented on mobile device and is capable of accommodating all 36 alphanumeric characters on a standard mo-
bile/smart phone screen.
• We perform exhaustive security and usability analysis of the proposed scheme to determine its impact in prac-
tice. We show that MobSecure is capable of achieving highest security standard compared to existing security
approaches to resist shoulder surﬁng attack.
Road map: In Section 2, we introduce and give a detailed overview of the proposed approach. Thereafter in
Section 3 and 4, we perform security and usability analysis of the proposed work. In Section 5, we compare our work
with some of the related shoulder surﬁng resilient schemes, before we ﬁnally conclude in Section 6 and give some
future directions of our work.
2. Proposed MobSecure Method
Proposed MobSecure works in partially observable environment to bypass the risk of observation attack. Under the
scope of this section we mainly focus on design principle of the proposed scheme and factors (like password choice,
challenge type) that inﬂuence the user’s behavior during login, using the proposed MobSecure.
Before going into details, we highlight some key features ofMobSecure, which will be elaborated in our subsequent
discussion.
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• The conventional smartphones are rectangular in shape. So the on-screen interface is designed in such a way
so that it can be accommodated nicely on smartphone’s screen area. For this purpose, the oval shape orbits are
selected.
• On the user interface, the alphabets and digits are arranged in a speciﬁc and static order so that in each authen-
tication session, users can locate their password character easily.
• Two nodes on a orbit posses same color to ease user calculation (during response) for those audio challenges,
containing a digit, greater than 8.
• If user mistakenly enters wrong character as response in a round, then user can go back to that round by using
BACK button and can modify his response. than 9
2.1. Password space and its type
User selects his password from both the sets {A, B,..., Z} and {0, 1,..., 9}. Characters in password may get repeated.
For example, for a password of length 4, H2L2, 2K4W, TTTT etc are some valid options. Thus, for a password of
length  the password space becomes 36. In MobSecure, we have kept default value of the password length as 4 to
get a better comparative view (ref. to Section 5).
2.2. User interface in MobSecure
User on-screen interface in MobSecure consists of 36 nodes each of which holds a unique character from the set {A,
B,..., Z, 0, 1,..., 9}. The layout of the user interface is shown in Figure 1. Here the nodes are spread over two elliptical
orbits namely − inner orbit and outer orbit. Each orbit holds 18 characters. We have used 9 colors to distinguish the
nodes in both the orbits. The colors are equally distributed as two nodes in an orbit hold the same color. Starting from
any node i, the repetition of color appears at (i +9)th node. In an orbit, two nodes with the same color are denoted as
sister nodes. The signiﬁcance of sister nodes will be elaborated in subsequent part of our discussion. In Fig. 1, we
present user on-screen interface of MobSecure in mobile device.
Fig. 1. User on-screen interface for smart phone. Inner orbit contains all digits from 0 to 9 and ﬁrst eight alphabets from A to H. Outer orbit
contains remaining alphabets from I to Z. In inner orbit, node containing 0 and 9 are an instance of sister nodes, having same color pink.
2.3. Challenge type and login strategy
As proposed method works in partially observable environment thus, a challenge in MobSecure is communicated
through a covert media, here through ear-phone. The challenges are basically audio signals which randomly vary
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between 0 to 17 and from 0−other to 17−other. In other words, a digit from 0 to 17 can be vocalized as challenge or,
other word may be appended to any of these digits and communicated as challenge. Thus, total 36 atomic elements
build the challenge space in the proposed scheme. In each round, one element from the challenge space is randomly
get selected as challenge in MobSecure. After listening to a challenge user submits response, based on his password
character and generated challenge.
Table 1. An instance of user responses for the password G5BZ.
Round Password Symbol Challenge Response
1 G 5 3
2 5 7−other U
3 B 6−other Z
4 Z 9 Q
As mentioned earlier, for the default value of password length as four, user faces same number of login rounds in a
session in the proposed approach. Based on the challenge in the ith round, user submits his response for the password
character, placed at ith position. For example, if user selects G5BZ as his password then while facing the ﬁrst round,
user submits his response for the ﬁrst password character G. After challenge is being communicated, user starts the
response procedure from the node, containing his password character. For example, if challenge comes as 5 in the ﬁrst
round for the ﬁrst password character G, user traverses ﬁve nodes in the clockwise direction in the same orbit, from the
node containing G. After traversing ﬁve nodes from node G, user reaches to the node containing digit 3 and submits 3
as response. If communicated challenge to the user ends with the word other then user makes a switch from one orbit
to other. For instance, for the password character 5, if challenge comes as 7−other then user ﬁrst reaches to the node
containing C in the inner orbit. After that user switches to the adjacent (outer) orbit to the node containing character
U, which is having same color as that of node C in inner orbit. Thus, for password character as 5 and challenge as
7−other, user submits his response as U.
The signiﬁcance of the sister nodes are − if challenge contains a digit (dc) greater or, equal to 9 then a smart
user can ﬁrst directly shifts to the other sister node, having the same color as of the node containing user password
character. Then user can traverse remaining dc-9 nodes. For example, for password character G, if challenge comes
as 12 then user can directly go to the node containing digit 7 which is placed at a distances of 9 nodes in clockwise
direction from the node G. Then user traverses remaining (12−9) or, 3 nodes in the same clockwise direction to reach
to the response node A in that round. Thus, a skilled user may take advantage of sister nodes to achieve faster response
time. In Table 1, we show a complete instance of user responses in a session for the password G5BZ. If user submits
wrong response at any round then he may press the BACK button (shown in Figure 1) to go to the previous round to
modify his response.
2.4. Validation of user response
SecuerPass stores user’s login information in terms of username and password. Password may be stored in hashed
format. From the responses, system is able to derive a password uniquely. If the derived password is matched with
the stored password in the database, then the system permits the login otherwise denies the user.
For judging the validity of user responses we have maintained a 2D array (2×18 in dimension ) namely − orbitarray
indexing from (0, 0) to (1, 17). The array contains digits from 0 to 9 and alphabets from A to H in the ﬁrst row and
alphabets I to Z in the second row. All the characters in the array are maintained in order. Algorithm 1 is used to
validate the user response. Before discussing the algorithm, next we have deﬁned some relevant functions, which are
used by the validation process.
• genChallenge() : Returns randomly generated challenge by the system in current round.
• getResponse() : Returns response, submitted by the user in current round.
• extractDigit() : This function returns the digit, belonging to a challenge. For example, if challenge comes as
16−other, then the function will return the value 16.
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• isContain() : It takes a string str and challenge as parameters and returns true if str is present in the communi-
cated challenge, otherwise returns false.
• getIndex() : This function takes a character and orbitarray as input and returns the index positionof that char-
acter in orbitarray.
• rowVal() : Takes an index of a 2D array as parameter and returns row number from that index. For example,
rowVal(1,5) will return 1.
• colVal() : Takes an index of a 2D array as parameter and returns column number from that index. For example,
colVal(1,5) will return 5.
• getChar() : This function takes input as an index value in the form of row index, column index, along with
orbitarray. The function returns the character belonging to the speciﬁed index in orbitarray.
• appendChar() : This function accepts a string (str) and character (chr) as parameters and appends chr to str.
Algorithm 1: Validation of user response
1 Input : This algorithm takes input as orbitarray and H(password), against the submitted username.
H(password) indicates the hashed value of user password.
2 Output : Derive the password from user response and validate user for login.
3 Initialization derivePass←− ∅ ;
4 for (i = 1 to ) do
5 C←− genChallenge();
6 respi ←− getResponse();
7 ind of resp←− getIndex(respi, orbitarray);
8 col index←− colVal(ind of resp);
9 dc←− extractDigit(C);
10 col index←− (18 + (col index − dc)) mod 18;
11 if (isContain(other, C)) then
12 row index←− rowVal(ind of resp) +1 mod 2;
13 derive char←− getChar(row index, col index, orbitarray);
14 end
15 else
16 row index←− rowVal(ind of resp);
17 derive char←− getChar(row index, col index, orbitarray);
18 end
19 derivePass←− appendChar(derivePass, derive char);
20 end
21 if (H(derivePass) = H(password)) then
22 action: Allows login;
23 end
24 else
25 action: Denies login;
26 end
In the next section we discuss about the security features of the proposed approach and evaluate strength of Mob-
Secure against diﬀerent attacks.
3. Security Analysis
The strength of proposed approach is analysed against following three attack scenarios − (a)Shoulder surﬁng attack
(b)Password guessing attack and (c) Side channel timing attack.
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3.1. Security against shoulder surﬁng attack
In MobSecure challenge is securely communicated to the user. Depending on a challenge, user can either reach to
any node or, can stay in the node, consisting his password character. For example, in Table 1, we have shown that in
the ﬁrst round, user enters 3 as response for password character G and audio challenge as 5. As attacker can’t access
to a challenge, and as G is secret information thus, attacker only gains information about response, here 3. Now
considering password character as secret, from adversary point of view, 3 can be derived for 36 possible (challenge,
secret) pair. Without loss of generality, if audio challenge comes as 0 or, 17−other then user may derive same response
3 for password character 3 or, M, respectively. Thus, (0, 3), (17−other, M) are 2 possible pairs among 36 possible
options. For any round, this argument is valid for any response submitted by user. So, without knowing generated
challenge, adversary always gets confused among |C| (cardinality of the challenge set) or, 36 possible options by
seeing each submitted response. Thus, MobSecure sets high security standard against shoulder surﬁng attack with
unrevealing user’s password for inﬁnite sessions.
3.2. Security against password guessing attack
Each character of user is chosen from a set holding 36 characters. As repetition of characters are allowed in the
password thus, it opens up an attack space of 36 to the adversary. For the default value of  = 4, the attack space
becomes 364 = 1679616, which is huge. If a system blocks a user after t unsuccessful login attempts then for standard
value of t as 3, probability of successful password guessing attack becomes 3/1679616, which is signiﬁcantly less.
3.3. Security against side channel timing attack
Using this attack strategy, adversary converges user password space, based on the response time of users15. In
MobSecure, the length of the challenges are not uniform. For example, challenges containing the word other are
larger in length and requires more time to communicate to user compared to challenges those only containing digit in
it.
Moreover, if a small digit (e.g., 2 or, 3) is communicated as challenge then user may achieve faster login time
compared to a challenge with larger number (e.g. 14 or, 15). This is because in the later case, user needs to traverse
more number of nodes to reach to the response node. However, the concept of sister node can help to reduce the
response time if the communicated digit in the challenge is very close to 9. For example, if 8 comes as challenge then
user can directly reach to the sister node and then shifts one node in the anticlockwise direction to reach to the desired
node.
Cagalj et al. show that most of the schemes using challenge response protocol are vulnerable to side channel
timing attack15. Proposed MobSecure is no exception in this context. However, this can be mitigated by forcing user
to response after a predeﬁned time only. If users are allowed to enter their responses, d seconds after listening to a
challenge then that may mask the time taken by user to calculate their responses. The imposed delay also masks the
diﬀerences between required time for generating longer (containing the word other) and shorter vocalized challenges.
But forceful delay will increase the response time to some extents. For our experiment purpose, we have avoided such
explicit pause while performing usability analysis, discussed in the next section.
4. Usability Analysis
To perform usability analysis we took help from 20 users. They all belonged to ages between 21 to 32. All
participants were android users with (correct-to) normal eyesight. We conducted usability analysis in two phases −
(a) training phase and (b) test phase. In training phase we presented motivation behind our work in front of those 20
participants. Then we introduced MobSecure and demonstrated how the scheme works to avoid the shoulder surﬁng
attack. We also show them how sister nodes can be helpful in achieving faster response time. Thereafter we loaded the
SeurePass application into the participant’s mobile phones and gave them some time for login. Then we conducted
a question answer session to address the diﬃculties which they were facing during login. After that we asked the
participants to report after two days for collecting the test data. We also declared and awarded some incentives for top
5 participants, achieved fastest login time.
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Fig. 2. Login time achieved by each 20 participants for each successful login operation. Average login time was obtained as 18.1 seconds. The
login time varied in the range between 13.34 to 24.28 seconds.
Two days after, in test phase, we collected test data based on the responses submitted by the participants. We
recorded the login time for each successful login from each participants. Participants, failed to login successfully, got
chances until s/he made a successful login. In test phase, all participants, except two, were successfully passed the
authentication session in the ﬁrst attempt. Those two participants committed 2 and 1 unsuccessful login attempts re-
spectively before submitting all correct responses in a session. We also observed that while submitting their responses,
some of them adopted an interesting trick to further reduce their response times. For the challenges containing a large
numbers ln close to 17 (like 15 or, 16), instead of moving in clockwise direction, users reached to their response nodes
by traversing 18-ln nodes in the anticlockwise direction. In Fig. 2 we show login time of each participants, against
successful login operations. As participants made 3 erroneous login attempt out of total 23 authentication sessions
thus, error during login obtained as 13.04%.
The login time using MobSecure is somewhat identical to the BW method9 or, FC method8, providing security
against weak shoulder surﬁng attack.
5. Comparative Analysis
In this section we show where the proposed MobSecure stands compared to the existing techniques to defend
shoulder surﬁng attack against powerful adversaries in partially observable environment. The comparative analysis
is performed from security and usability point of view. For comparative analysis we have considered − proposed
Mod 10 method by G.T. Wilfong10, STL method in11 and recently proposed Color Pass method12. As MobSecure
is implemented on mobile device thus, we have also included BW method9 and FC method8, which work in mobile
environment to defend weak shoulder surﬁng attack.
In all the methods, except color pass, users choose PIN as shared secret information. In color pass, users remember
four colors for login purpose. To measure user friendliness of the considered approaches here, we ask same set of
participants to perform usability analysis. Except Color Pass, as all approaches can be implemented on mobile device
thus, the usability analysis of those are performed in the same manner as of MobSecure (described in Section 4).
For Color Pass, usability study was conducted in a diﬀerent manner. We implemented Color Pass in our laboratory’s
Table 2. Comparative analysis of the methods from the usability and security perspectives. The analysis shows that MobSecure meets with highest
security standard and achieves moderate usability score compared to others. IM parameter denotes whether a method is implementable on mobile
device or not. SS/RA indicates number of safe authentication sessions against recording attack. All the times are calculated in seconds.
Method Resilient against Avg login time % of error Password Space DoC Pr[guess attack] IM SS/RA
Color Pass strong adversary 12.28 9.09 104 10 0.0001 no inﬁnite
Mod 10 strong adversary 9.2 16.66 104 10 0.0001 yes inﬁnite
STL strong adversary 13.41 9.09 104 10 0.0001 yes inﬁnite
BW weak adversary 19.5 9.09 104 5 0.0001 yes 0
FC weak adversary 20.31 13.04 104 5 0.0001 yes 0
MobSecure strong adversary 18.1 13.04 364 36 5.95 × 10-7 yes inﬁnite
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desktop machine and asked the participants to use color pass for login purpose. After seven days of practice, we
collected test data for Color pass. After gathering all test data from the users, for all these approaches including
MobSecure, we compared the usability standard in terms of average login time and percentage of error during login.
While comparing security standard, we introduce degree of confusion or, DoC as a parameter which indicates, the
number of options, among which the adversary gets confused after seeing a response submitted by user. The overall
comparative results from both security and usability perspectives have been shown in Table 2. As mentioned in Section
4, the login time using MobSecure is somewhat identical to proposed BW9 and FC8 methods.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have proposed a novel shoulder surﬁng resilient method which attains very high security standard
compared to existing approaches. Proposed scheme works in partially observable mobile environment to address the
threat of shoulder surﬁng attack for inﬁnite number of sessions against powerful eavesdropper. We also give some
directions to show how the impact of side channel timing attack can be mitigated using the proposed MobSecure.
Although MobSecure provides several advantages, but from usability point of view still there is a scope of improve-
ment. In future, we would further analyse on how to improve the usability aspects. However, allowing alphanumeric
password to be chosen by user and working in the mobile environment are two highlights of the proposed scheme.
We believe our contribution in this paper will further motivate researchers to develop more secure and usable shoulder
surﬁng resilient approaches.
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